Categoria:
Seminário
Onde:
Presencial
Local:
Sala de Seminários do DI e Google Meet
Descrição:
Classical distributed systems aim at increasing the availability and fault-tolerance of services and applications, but ignore the danger of cyber-attacks and malicious intrusions. Byzantine fault tolerant replication (BFT SMR) can protect distributed systems from these threats, but still only safeguards their availability and integrity, disregarding confidentiality as a concern. Indeed, even though BFT SMR can tolerate a fraction of maliciously corrupted replicas, a single corruption is enough to expose data privacy and break the confidentiality of the systems. Traditional approaches to ensure confidentiality, such as data encryption, can be employed to mitigate this problem but may not be enough, as there is still the issue of how to manage cryptographic keys, perform secure computations, and protect against leakage-abusage and file-injection attacks. In this talk, I will present recent research results of my team in confidential distributed systems and why encryption is only the beginning when trying to build practical distributed systems that provide availability, integrity, and confidentiality guarantees.
